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Furthermore, the Court's broad acceptance of the "certainty of no
influence" test regarding harmless error creates the probability that
its rationale will be used outside the area of incriminating confessions, since the application of the harmless error statute is, thus,
limited to trivial errors in the admission of evidence, without
regard to the other evidence in the case.
Reversal in the instant case, of course, precludes review and
there is no easy prognosis as to future Supreme Court declarations
in this frequently appealed, factually distinguishable area. It would
appear that the difficulty of proof of conspiracy counts puts a
premimn on the use of a legally obtained confession in a government case. This might influence the Court to retain the admissibility of codefendant's confessions in as many factual situations
as possible, e.g., where there is no prejudice to the non-confessing
defendants because of the overwhelming substantial evidence
against them and where the jury has shown no reliance on the
confession. Because of the narrow majority margin in Jackson,
wherein the Delli Paoli rationale was criticized, there is little concrete indicia as to the life expectancy of the Delli Paoli rule. It is
suggested, nevertheless, that the instant decision shows a definite
resolve on the part of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to keep
its own courts in order even without Supreme Court directive, and
to use judicial initiative to give every defendant a completely fair
trial.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IMPRISONMENT RESULTING IN MORE
THAN ONE YEAR'S CONFINEMENT FOR A MISDEMEANOR DUn TO

INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY A FINE: DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND CONTRARY TO THE INTENT OF THE NEW
YORK STATUTE.Appellant, an indigent, pleaded guilty to a mis-

demeanor. The trial court, with full knowledge of appellant's
financial condition, sentenced him to one year's imprisonment and
fined him $500 with a provision that the fine, if not paid, be served
out at the rate of one day's imprisonment for each dollar unpaid.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed and held that when
the trial court is cognizant of an individual's inability to pay
a fine, subsequent imprisonment in lieu of the fine resulting in
imprisonment for more than the permissible maximum sentence,
is contrary to the intent of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure. Such imprisonment violates the defendant's right to
equal protection of the law, and is proscribed by the eighth amendment to the federal constitution as an excessive fine. People v.
Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).
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The imposition of a fine for criminal conduct had its genesis
in the middle ages in England. Initially known as a tariff, the
fine was developed as a compensatory substitute for the interfamilial feuds to which the social organization of medieval Britain
lent itself." At first, the injured party received the benefits of the
fine, minus a small fee claimed by the king to cover the cost of
the trial and the harm done to the' public peace. Subsequently,
decreased, until, finally, the
the victim's share was successively
2
king became the sole recipient.
The use of fines as a criminal sanction is common in the
United States today.3 Imprisonment for nonpayment has become4
a prominent sanction in the administration of our criminal laws,
with the courts taking the position that such imprisonment is a
method of compelling payment and not a form of punishment for
the crime.,
In New York, 6 imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine is
authorized by Sections 484 and 7187 of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure. Such confinement has repeatedly been held
to be a valid means of enforcing the sentence of the court, and
not a part of that sentence. For example, in McKinney v. Hamilton,8
the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor and fined $10,000
by a justice of the peace acting as a court of special sessions.
Upon defendant's refusal to pay the fine, he was committed for
10,000 days (over twenty-seven years) or until the fine was
satisfied. The defendant appealed, arguing that due to the length
of his confinement he had, in fact, been convicted of a felony,
a crime over which the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction.
Rejecting this contention, the New York Court of Appeals indicated
that the commitment authorized by section 718 for failure to pay
a fine does not operate to increase the penalty specified in the
criminal statute. "It follows only upon a defendant's failure to
12 HolD SwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISn LAW 43-44, 46 (4th ed. 1936).
2 SUTHERLAND

1955).
3

& CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY

275-76 (5th ed.

1 d. at 276.

4RUBIN, CRIuMINA . CoRECTIONS 230 (1963).
5 In re Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 193, 84 Pac. 781 (Ct. App. 1906) ; Mullin v.
State, 38 Del. 533, 194 At. 578 (Super. Ct 1937).
0

For a general discussion of fines as a sentence in New York, see

TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL

CODE, PRopoSE NEW YORK PENAL CODE (1964) (Appendix A).
7 Section 484 reads in part: "A judgment that the defendant pay a fine
may also direct that he be imprisoned, until the fine be satisfied, specifying
the extent of the imprisonment which cannot exceed one day for every
"A judgment that the
Section 718 reads in part:
dollar of the fine."
defendant pay a fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine
be satisfied; specifying the extent of the imprisonment, which cannot exceed
one day for every dollar of the fine. . . "

8282 N.Y. 393, 26 N.E.2d 949 (1940).
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pay the fine and is a means of bringing about collection of the
same." 9
The application of these statutes, authorizing imprisonment to
enforce payment of a fine, most severely affects indigents. Since
their poverty generally precludes payment of any fine, the alternative
"pay or be imprisoned" is illusory and invariably has the effect
of outright imprisonment. As a result of the Supreme Court's
increasing reliance upon the equal protection clause10 to improve
the plight of the indigent defendant, the argument could be made
that such an incarceration of an indigent violates this clause. While
the Supreme Court has never treated this issue, it focused its attention on an analogous problem in Griffin v. Illinois "- when it
concerned itself with the plight of an indigent in obtaining a fair
trial. The Court considered whether an indigent was denied equal
protection by an Illinois procedure which conditioned appeal upon
the purchase of a trial transcript. On appeal in the state court,
defendants' motion that a certified copy of the entire record of their
trial be furnished them without cost, due to their indigence, had
been denied. The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection
both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious
discriminations between persons and different groups of persons. Both
equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our
entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far
as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice
in every American court'. .. . In criminal trials a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race,
or color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and12could not be used
as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.
The question whether an indigent imprisoned for nonpayment of
a fine is denied equal protection has been before the lower courts.
In United States ex rel. Priviterav. Kross,"3 an indigent defendant
was convicted of illegal possession of policy slips and sentenced
In his
to thirty days and $500 or sixty additional days.
appeal, the defendant claimed that such a sentence violated the
equal protection clause and was an excessive fine. He contended
that the nonpayment of the fine, resulting in his imprisonment for
an additional sixty days, was attributable solely to his lack of
9Id. at 397-98, 26 N.E2d at 951.
§-1.
11351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,
12

Id. at 17-18. (Emphasis added.)

239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965).
18

1967 ]

RECENT DECISIONS

funds. Another individual with the means to pay the fine would
not be obliged to suffer the additional imprisonment. Rejecting
this contention, the court said that in light of the defendant's prior
criminal record and other relevant factors, any comparison between
him and another defendant who can pay the fine and thus avoid
confinement was not proper. 14 The judge noted that this sentence
was not imposed upon the petitioner because he was poor. Rather,
it was imposed because he had committed a crime, and "once
convicted, petitioner has no constitutional right that another defendant, no matter what his economic status, rich or poor, receive
the same sentence for the same offense." 15 It was observed that
since sentences are individualized, no useful purpose would be served
by a comparison between the sentence of this defendant and that
of a hypothetical defendant.' 6
On similar facts, a New York County Court in People v.
Collins17 reached the opposite conclusion. There, the indigent
defendant had been convicted of assault in the third degree. He
was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days confinement
and fined $250 or one day for each dollar remaining unpaid.
The court asserted that such a sentence violated the equal protection clause. It reasoned that while a rich man could limit his
term of imprisonment by simply paying the fine, no such alternative
is available to the indigent.'" The court concluded:
it is only if we equate the payment of the fine with the additional period
of detention in prison that both men can be said to stand equal before
the law. An equation of one day of a man's liberty in jail for every
$1 of the fine, in this enlightened era, should be examined very carefully
before this form of equality of treatment is indorsed.19
However, the court stated that the fine could still be imposed, and
the state could take such action to collect it as is otherwise
available.20

14 Id. at 120.
'15bid. See United States ex rel. Weiss v. Fay, 232 F. Supp. 912
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). Cf. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Fay, 211 F. Supp. 812,
814 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also, Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the
Police
and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962).
'8 United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118, 120
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
911 (1965).
17 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Orange County Ct 1965). Contra,
People ex rel. Loos v. Redman, 48 Misc. 2d 592, 265 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
Is People v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 212, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970, 973 (Orange
County Ct 1965).

'2 Ibid.
0 Id. at 213, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
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In the instant case, the defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor of assault in the third degree. Section 245 of the New
York Penal Law limits the punishment for such a crime to imprisonment for not more than one year, or a fine of not more
than $500, or both. Defendant was given the mnaximum sentence
allowable, with additional imprisonment of one day per dollar of the
fine remaining unpaid. The defendant was unable to pay the
assessment due to his indigency-a fact known to the trial court
since it had assigned him counsel for this reason at the initiation
of the criminal proceedings.
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously vacated the
sentence. The Court declared that the issue was "whether a
defendant who has no money or property can be made to serve
out a fine a $1 per day.''21 It reasoned that since Sections 484
and 718 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure were
designed to compel the offender who refuses to pay a fine to obey
the direction of the court, such imprisonment of an indigent defendant, who cannot possibly pay, is directly contrary to the
meaning and intent of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 22 The
Court accepted the defendant's contention that, under Griffin 23
and other similar decisions, it is a denial of due process and
equal protection to allow an individual's poverty to increase the
length of his imprisonment. Consequently, "the man who can pay
and the man who cannot are not treated equally." 24 The Court
went further, however, and suggested another ground of unconstitutionality, i.e., the prohibition against "excessive fines" found
in both the state and federal constitutions. The Court noted that
there were no controlling decisions on the question but stated:
a fine of $500 for a common misdemeanor, levied on a man who has
no money at all, is necessarily excessive when it means in reality that
he must be jailed for a period far longer than the normal period for
the crime, since it deprives the defendant of all ability to earn a
livelihood . . . [by] keeping him in the penetentiary far longer than
25

would ordinarily be the case.

Since the instant case represents the first time the New York
Court of Appeals has considered the relation of criminal fines to
indigency, the Court was reluctant to issue an expansive holding.
21

People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 103, 218 N.E.2d 686, 687, 271 N.Y.S.2d
972, 974 (1966).
22 Ibid.

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 218 N.E.2d 686, 688, 271 N.Y.S2d
972, 975 (1966).
25 Ibid. The Court compared the absurdly low rate of one dollar per day
to the New York State minimum wage now set at $1.50 per hour.
23
24
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It, therefore, limited its holding to situations where the fine resulted in imprisonment for more than one year, the maximum prison
term for a misdemeanor. The meaning and intent of the New
York Code of Criminal Procedure is in no way similarly limited.
The purpose of Sections 484 and 718 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to provide a means to enforce the sentence of
the court. Once a judge knows that it will be virtually impossible
for a defendant to pay a fine, his alternative pronouncement of
one day for every one dollar of the fine remaining unpaid becomes
purely vindictive. Consequently, it would seem that imprisonment
so imposed would be equally subject to attack regardless of the fact
that the total duration of confinement does not exceed one year for
a misdemeanor.
As applied to an indigent, a sentence of six
months and a fine of one hundred dollars or an additional one
hundred days, is as contrary to the meaning and intent of the
Code of Criminal Procedure as a sentence of one year and a fine of
$500 or an additional 500 days.
Although the holding of the principal case does not make fines
imposed on indigents invalid in themselves, it does impose a severe
limitation on their effectiveness as punishment for crimes. It seems
doubtful that there exists any means in New York for the enforcement of fines imposed as a criminal penalty other than commitment
of defendant to prison until the fine is paid. 28 Although some jurisdictions regard a fine as in the nature of a debt to the state which
may be enforced by execution against defendant's property, 27 in
New York it is questionable whether any inherent 28 or statutory
power" of this type exists. It is submitted that the legislature
must formulate a statutory scheme which would render the state
able to collect such a fine.30 One possible method is to require an
26People ex rel. Gately v. Sage, 13 App. Div. 135, 43 N.Y. Supp. 372

(2d Dep't 1897).

27 See Dickson v. Officers of the Court, 36 Ga. App. 341, 136 S.E. 537

(1927); Gill v. State, 39 W. Va. 479, 20 S.E. 568 (1894).
28 Compare Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1831),

with

People ex rel. Gately v. Sage, supra note 26, and Conlon v. Lisk, 13 App.
Div. 195, 43 N.Y. Supp. 364 (2d Dep't 1897).

29At present, although a fine imposed upon a corporation may be collected
in the same manner as a civil action, N.Y. CODE CRIm. Paoc. § 682, no similar
provision appears to be applicable to an individual. N.Y. JuDiClARY LAw
§§ 790-96 provide for a procedure for execution to collect a fine imposed upon
"agrand or trial juror, or upon any officer or other person," N.Y. JimiclARy
LAW § 790, but the legislative history indicates this vas not intended to be
applied to a fine imposed in a judgment of conviction. TEMPORARY STATE

CoM 'N ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIlNAL CODE, PROPOSED
NEW YoRK PE-NAL LAw A-62 n.73 (1964) (Appendix A).

30Examples of such schemes include: CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1205; MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 279, §§ 1, IA (1956) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953 (1964);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-593 (1962) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953);
Wis. STAT. § 57.04 (Supp. 1965).
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indigent to pay his fine in installments. Another- feasible procedure
would be to establish a fine enforcement system similar to the civil
remedy of docketing a judgment, with a view towards executing on
defendant's future property.
Assuming that there is no other valid or workable means
available in New York to enforce fines imposed on indigents, it
may be anticipated that courts will increase the period of confinement of the indigent, and avoid imposing any fine at all. For
example, when a judge could impose a sentence for up to one
year and/or a fine up to $500 for a misdemeanor, he would possibly pronounce sentence at six months and $300. Henceforth, for
the same offense, confronted with defendant's inability to pay a
fine, rather than forego the additional punishment, the tendency
may be to pronounce a sentence at eleven months and, of course,
no fine. The punitive effect of the combination of fine and imprisonment can be seen to be relatively equal when one is decreased
as the other is correspondingly increased. While such an increase
of time to be served would clearly be a valid exercise of the criminal court's broad discretion to punish a defendant within the statutory limits set for his crime, nevertheless, the criminal court judge
must continually refer back to the rationale of sections 484 and 718,
and of the instant case, to be certain that he does not disproportionately increase the time an indigent defendant must serve because
the fine is not available.
Since the decision in Saffore was justified on the rationale
underlying the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court's reliance
on the equal protection clause and the constitutional prohibition
against excessive fines seems to be designed merely to give added
authoritativeness to its holding. Each of these constitutional
grounds is subject to counterarguments of varying strength. The
Court's equal protection argument, while persuasive, is subject to
attack on the ground that the penalty imposed for a crime is, in
and of itself, objective, and, although it will affect each defendant
differently, it cannot be said to deny equal protection of the laws.
The government has not yet been compelled "to eradicate from the
administration of criminal justice every disadvantage caused by
indigence." 31 The Court's conclusion that the fine imposed is invalid as constitutionally excessive seems open to even more serious
criticism, since this provision has traditionally not been applied
unless the fine is so wholly disproportionate to the nature of .the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. 3 2 Using this
approach, a fine of $500 or imprisonment for less than two years
for criminal assault would seem to be sufficiently proportionate to
the crime to be valid.
31
32

United States ex tel. Privitera v. Kross, supra note 16.
People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 184 N.E.2d 833 (1962.
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Another unresolved issue implicit in the holding of the instant
case concerns the standard to be applied in determining who is
sufficiently indigent to warrant this immunity from imprisonment.
In Saffore, the defendant was apparently completely without funds
and property. The Court, presented with such a clear case of
indigency, was not required to devise any more explicit standard
than the word "indigent." In closer cases, where varying degrees
of poverty are presented to the courts, some more specific test will
have to be developed. Certainly, this definition of indigency will
have to be reconciled with the "indigency" that gives a criminal
defendant the right to state-provided counsel. Even persons with
a limited amount of money, who are deemed sufficiently solvent
to afford competent counsel, but who exhaust their financial resources to secure one, appear to be entitled to the immunity from
imprisonment for failure to pay fines under the holding of the
instant case.
As an immediate consequence of the instant case, the attention
of the criminal courts will be refocused on the proper purpose of
any confinement they impose in attempting to enforce a fine. Imprisonment in lieu of payment can only be justified when the
criminal can afford to pay the fine. This procedure was designed
to punish those with ample means by exacting of them a legislatively determined sacrifice in money proportionate to the seriousness of their crime. Knowingly transforming this monetary obligation into an unavoidable additional incarceration cannot be justified.
Clearly the Court was correct in determining that the criminal must
be capable of paying the fine before he can be imprisoned for his
"refusal" to pay it.

TAXATION - INTEREST DEDUCTION - TRANSACTION MUST BE
ECONOMICALLY PUmOsIVE TO QUALIFY FOR INTEREST DEDUCTION.

Petitioner, a sweepstakes winner, attempted to reduce her tax
liability by creating a large prepaid interest deduction. Borrowing
almost one million dollars, she purchased treasury notes which,
in turn, were pledged to secure the loans. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that, even though the transaction was not
a sham, the interest deduction was not allowable under Section 163
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 since the sole purpose of
petitioner's acts was tax avoidance. Goldstein v. Commissioner,
364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
With certain exceptions, Section 163 of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that the deduction of interest must be supported by
(1) an indebtedness, (2) interest on the indebtedness, and (3)
-

